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Abstract 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The perceived impact of shop closing hours on our economy and work-life 
balance has stood at the centre of numerous public policy debates in many Western 
countries. As a result, the majority of restrictions on shop opening hours have been 
repealed or declared unconstitutional in most US states, the UK and Canada.1 And in 
many European countries where regulation still is the rule rather than the exception, the 
debate is looming.2 A common concern in cost-benefit analyses of deregulation is its 
perceived impact on employment. It is therefore the aim of this paper to shed some light 
on how deregulation most likely affects retail labor and product markets and therefore 
ultimately employment. 
 This paper first examines the most commonly imposed restriction on shop 
opening hours known as Sunday Closing Laws or Blue Laws.3 It is documented that 10 
US states deregulated at some point between 1977 and 1992 and 8 states still had Sunday 
Closing Laws in 1997. It is this variation in regulation between US states at different 
points in time that will serve to identify the impact of shop closing hours on retail labor 
and product markets.  
                                                 
1
 For example, see Section II for a discussion of the history of Sunday Closing Laws in the US. See Maher 
[1995] for a history of Sunday Closing Laws in the UK and Skuterud [2004] for Canada. 
2
 For example, see Kajalo [1997] for a discussion of Sunday Closing Laws across Europe. 
3
 There is disagreement about the origin of the term “Blue Laws”. Some claim it refers to the color of the 
paper upon which the first laws of New Haven were printed in 1665. New Haven ordered 500 hundred 
copies of its laws to be printed in England. These printed laws were returned on blue-colored paper. Others 
claim that the blue referred to by the term “blue laws” bears testimonial to the strictness with which the 
laws were observed by the Puritans. Just as a “true blue” dye never fades, so a person of fixed principles 
will not be easily swayed to depart from them. See Laband and Heinbuch [1987] for further discussion. 
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 Using the Census of Retail Trade for 1997, this paper then provides some 
evidence that employment, revenue and the number of shops in regulated industries are 
significantly smaller in states with Sunday Closing Laws. This is true looking at the 
fraction of total retail for regulated industries or comparing outcomes per 1000 
inhabitants or per dollar of personal disposable income in each state. To further test this 
hypothesis, this paper then turns to the Census of Retail Trade for years 1977, 1982, 1987 
and 1992. It is shown that deregulation increases employment with 4.4 to 6.4 percent, 
revenue with 3.9 to 10.7 percent and the number of shops with 1 to 1.5 percent. These 
estimates are remarkably robust using different specifications and different data. Also, 
some suggestive evidence is shown for the hypothesis that deregulation negatively affects 
employment, revenue and the number of shops in industries exempted from Sunday 
Closing Laws. 
 This paper finally presents a model building on standard assumptions about retail 
markets to explain the observed impact of deregulation. For deregulating industries, it is 
argued that deregulation is likely to increase employment because at least one person has 
to be employed at all opening times (threshold labor effect). Also, in so far the observed 
increase in revenue due to increased product demand reflects an increase in the volume of 
sales, employment will further increase (sales effect). Finally, if the increase in revenue 
dominates the increase in labor costs, retailers will extend their opening hours and profits 
will increase. The number of shops will therefore increase if barriers to entry are low, 
further increasing employment (profitability effect). However, to the extend that 
consumers substitute income towards deregulating industries, employment losses 
elsewhere will be larger the more important is threshold labor, the stronger are 
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preferences for Sunday shopping and the lower are entry barriers. In line with the 
empirical evidence, these are the channels through which it is argued that deregulation 
affects retail labor and product markets and therefore ultimately employment. 
 There is a small but growing literature related to the idea that product market 
regulation affects employment. Krueger and Pischke [1997] argue that product market 
constraints may depress employment growth. For example, they state that zoning laws 
(regulating the start-up of companies) may have hampered employment growth in many 
European countries. To this end, Bertrand and Kramarz [2002] examine zoning laws in 
the French retail industry to conclude that retail employment could have been more than 
10 percent higher in the absence of such laws. Similarly, restrictive store opening hours 
could partially explain why employment in retail is relatively low. This hypothesis has 
recently been scrutinized by Skuterud [2004] for Canada concluding that regulation 
decreases retail employment with 5 to 12.5 percent. Similarly, Burda and Weil [2001] 
estimate an employment decrease of 2.5 percent from regulation mainly using repeated 
cross-sections of US states. As a statement about the impact of shop closing hours on 
employment these estimates are probably correct. But this paper argues that simply 
looking at correlations between employment and product market regulation is not able to 
explain how exactly these employment changes come about. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents the US 
history of Sunday Closing Laws. Section III describes the main data used and Section IV 
shows that employment, revenue and the number of shops are most likely to increase in 
deregulating industries and to decrease in industries exempted from Sunday Closing 
Laws. Section V then starts from what we know about retail markets to present a model 
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that predicts the observed impact of deregulation on retail labor and product markets. The 
final section concludes.  
  
II. SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS 
 
Sunday Closing Laws are an ancient institution in American law. The first Sunday 
law passed on American soil was enacted by the Colony of Virginia in 1610. By the end 
of the 18th Century, all thirteen colonies had Sunday closing laws written in their statutes. 
During the heydays of Sunday Closing Laws at the end of the 19th Century, state 
regulation of Sunday commerce was so prevalent that 46 states restricted at least some 
businesses to open on Sunday.4  
In 1961 Sunday Closing Laws were ascribed the purpose of securing a common 
day of rest by the United States Supreme Court, making them binding in all remaining 
thirty-three states.5 However, the validity of Sunday Closing Laws in some of those states 
has recently been challenged on the basis of their classifications of businesses or 
commodities covered by the law.6 Consequently, a further 25 states deregulated their 
Sunday Closing Laws between 1961 and 1997.7 Figure 1 shows the 10 states that 
                                                 
4
 Dilloff [1980] and Laband and Heinbuch [1987] provide more details on the early history of Sunday 
closing laws in the US. 
5
 See Theuman [2004] for further details of McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) and its companion 
cases. 
6
 Theuman [2004] further discusses state and federal cases decided since 1961 regarding the validity, 
construction and effect of Sunday closing laws. 
7
 Figure 1 is not referring to Sunday Closing Laws that affect automobile shops are shops selling alcohol on 
Sunday. The decision was made to focus on general Sunday Closing Laws to avoid a patchwork of 
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deregulated between 1979 and 1997 (with dates when statutes were repealed or declared 
unconstitutional) as well as all 8 states that had Sunday Closing Laws in 1997.8 It is this 
variation that will be exploited in this paper to identify the impact of shop closing hours 
on retail labor and product markets. 
 
III. DATA  
 
The main data used in this study is the Economic Census of Retail Trade. The 
Census of Retail Trade is part of the Economic Census conducted every five years ending 
in 2 or 7. The strength of the Census is that it aims to sample all retail activity in the US. 
From every survey, total weekly employment (number of paid employees in the week 
including March 12), real total annual revenue, the number of establishments and real 
total annual payroll are calculated for a number of industries in retail. The procedures for 
data collection and dissemination can be found on the Census Bureau web-page.  
 The first main dataset used in this study is the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The 
advantage of this data is that it measures retail activity for narrowly defined NAICS 
industries. However, the more precise NAICS classification introduced in 1997is no 
longer comparable with the SIC classifications used in earlier surveys. A second 
comparability problem arises because the Census of Retail Trade for the first time 
includes some new store types in 1997. For example, for the 1997 Census of Retail Trade 
                                                                                                                                                 
legislation. It seems unlikely that Sunday opening implies consumers buy more cars and the fraction of 
liquor stores in retail seems too small to largely affect activity in other stores.    
8
 Appendices A and B contain more detailed legal references. 
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includes wholesalers open to the general public such as computer shops, office supply 
dealers and building material stores.   
 The second main data set used in this paper collects state level data for the years 
1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992 from a variety of Census sources for 8 industries in retail. The 
strength of this data is that it not only allows a comparison between states and industries 
at one point in time. However, one difficulty using this data is that information is 
available only for those 8 industries. A second difficulty is that only measures for every 
two consecutive years are comparable. This is due to changes in the sampling criteria and 
industry classification between 1977 and 1982 and changes in the industry classification 
between 1982 and 1987 and 1987 and 1992. To this end, the Census Bureau has made 
public two data sets for 1982 and 1987, one comparable with the previous sampling year 
and one comparable with the following sampling year. 
 
 IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Using the 1997 Census of Retail Trade  
 To see whether shop closing hours have any effect on retail labor and product 
markets, we first use the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. Table 1 provides some information 
about the different types of shops in retail. The group of “Regulated Industries” consists 
of all industries prohibited to open on Sunday if a state has or would have Sunday 
Closing Laws. The remaining store retailers are listed in the group of “Other Industries”. 
For this group it is less clear whether the industry of food stores and drug and propriety 
stores generally represents shops subject to or exempted from Sunday Closing Laws. 
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However, the 1997 Census of Retail Trade contains information for more narrowly 
defined shop types such that these industries can be broken down further. For example, 
Table 1 breaks down the group of food stores into supermarkets, convenience stores and 
specialty food stores. And even though supermarkets may also sell food which generally 
is an exempted product, there has been some controversy about their Sunday opening. 
Unfortunately, it is also uncertain whether convenience stores have always been 
exempted from Sunday Closing Laws such that it is not immediately clear whether 
differences in restrictiveness of Sunday Closing Laws between both types of food stores 
can be expected.9 For drug and propriety stores the difference could be more outspoken 
since cosmetics, beauty and perfume stores most often do not sell prescription drugs and 
have therefore mostly been prohibited to open on Sunday in contrast to pharmacies. 
Besides pharmacies, the group of gasoline stations (often with convenience stores) is also 
more likely to generally represent shops selling products exempted from Sunday Closing 
Laws. The more detailed industry classification available from the 1997 Census of Retail 
Trade therefore allows to examine how regulation not only affects activity in regulated 
industries but also shops exempted from Sunday Closing Laws. 
 The numbers in Table 1 are average percentages for each industry across states. 
For the regulated industries, general merchandise stores (which are mainly department 
stores) are the largest employer. Average store size in terms of employment is relatively 
large for general merchandise stores whereas miscellaneous retail stores seem relatively 
small. For other industries, food stores are the second biggest employer and Table 1 
                                                 
9
 See Theuman [2004] for a number of cases. 
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shows that the majority is employed in relatively few supermarkets whereas gas stations 
are relatively small. All in all, these findings do not seem counter intuitive.  
 Table 1 gives mean percentages pooling states with and without Sunday Closing 
Laws. To get an idea whether regulation has any impact, one would like to see whether 
these means differ significantly between states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. 
This is done in Table 2. The first row of Table 2 gives the mean percentages for all 
regulated industries in states with Sunday Closing Laws. The second row calculates mean 
percentages for the same industries in states without Sunday Closing Laws. The third row 
calculates the mean differences between the first and the second row, suggesting 
regulated industries are relatively smaller in states with Sunday Closing Laws. The final 
row of Table 2 reports these differences as a fraction of the first row. What these fractions 
suggest is that regulation could reduce employment with 6 percent and revenue and the 
number of shops with 7 percent in regulated industries. Also note that if other industries 
in states with Sunday Closing Laws are indirectly affected by such laws, the estimated 
differences nevertheless suggest some impact of regulation on retail labor and product 
markets. 
 A further test for this hypothesis is to see whether mean differences exist per 1000 
inhabitants. The results are found in the top panel of Table 3. The first row suggests that 
in regulated industries, regulation decreases employment with 2.5 workers per 1000 
inhabitants, decreases annual expenditure with $603 per inhabitant per year and decreases 
the number of shops with 0.096 per 1000 inhabitants. The low standard errors suggest the 
differences are statistically significant except for the number of shops. To see whether 
states with and without Sunday Closing Laws do not differ for other reasons, one can 
 10 
compare the estimated mean differences for regulated industries given in the first row of 
Table 3 with mean differences for other industries given in the second row of Table 3. If 
retail is generally larger in regulated states as suggested by the mean differences for other 
industries, the difference-in-differences given in the third row of Table 3 suggest that 
regulation decreases employment with 3.4 jobs per 1000 inhabitants, decreases annual 
expenditure with $565 per inhabitant and decreases the number of shops with 0.3 per 
1000 inhabitants in regulated industries. 
 Rather than comparing differences per 1000 inhabitants in each state, the bottom 
panel of Table 3 compares mean differences per dollar of personal disposable. To allow 
for the numbers to be roughly comparable to those presented in the top panel, all means 
are multiplied with average income per 1000 inhabitants. The final row of Table 3 
estimates that regulation could decrease annual expenditure with $458 per average 
income and depress employment and the number of shops with 2.4 and 0.19 per $21.7m 
respectively. Note that these differences are relatively similar to those presented in the 
top panel of Table 3. 
 A final check is to see whether differences between states with and without 
Sunday Closing Laws are similar for more types of shops. For regulated industries, Table 
4 gives mean differences similar to those presented in Table 3 for annual revenue using 
both the population and income normalizations. Table 4 suggests these differences are 
roughly similar for different regulated industries. The results in Table 4 suggest that 
consumers spend less mainly on building material and garden stores and furniture and 
home furnishings stores in regulated states. Also interesting are the estimated differences 
for other industries given in Table 5. Table 5 shows that the differences for pharmacies 
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and drug stores are positive whereas the differences for cosmetics, beauty and perfume 
stores are negative. These opposing signs could indicate that regulation negatively affects 
sales in regulated shops but positively affects sales in exempted stores. Also, the 
differences for gasoline stations are positive and relatively large. These estimates are not 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that consumers substitute income away from regulated 
shops towards stores exempted from such regulation.  
 To conclude, a simple cross-section analysis learned that regulation most likely 
reduces employment, revenue and the number of shops in regulated industries. Moreover, 
some evidence was shown for the hypothesis that regulation increases employment, 
revenue and the number of shops in industries exempted from Sunday Closing Laws.  
 
 Using the 1977-1992 Census of Retail Trade 
To further provide evidence for the hypothesis that deregulation has an impact on 
retail labor and product markets, Census of Retail Trade data for years 1977, 1982, 1987 
and 1992 have been collected. Table 6 summarizes these data. The industries listed as 
“Deregulating Industries” are roughly similar to those in the 1997 Census of Retail Trade 
except for the group of miscellaneous retailers which has now been listed under “Other 
Industries”.  The reason for doing so is that the more aggregate industry classification 
used by the Census Bureau before 1997 does not allow excluding the non-store retailers 
from this group. Because estimates for more narrowly defined shops are not available 
before 1997, not much can therefore be said a priori about whether other industries 
generally represent regulated or non-regulated stores, except for gasoline service stations. 
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The mean percentages in Table 6 are calculated after pooling all years and the reported 
standard errors therefore reflect variation in the industry composition between states.  
 
Some preliminary results 
 Just as in the previous section, one can compare mean percentages for 
deregulating industries between states with and without Sunday Closing Laws to see 
whether deregulation has any long-run impact. Table 7 shows these differences for each 
Census sampling year between 1977and 1992 as a fraction of the mean percentage for 
states with Sunday Closing Laws. All estimates are positive suggesting deregulation 
increases employment with about 2 percent, increases revenue with 3 to 5 percent and the 
number of shops with 1 to 2 percent in deregulating industries.  Also note these estimates 
are somewhat smaller but not very different from those reported in the bottom row of 
Table 2. 
 One problem with using each Census wave separately is that it is difficult to 
identify the causal impact of deregulation from a cross-section of states and industries. 
The remainder of this section therefore uses the different timing of deregulation for those 
states that deregulated between 1979 and 1992 (note from Figure 1 that no state 
deregulated between 1992 and 1997) to examine the impact of deregulation using the 
1977-1992 Census of Retail Trade as a panel. In order to do so, an important question is 
to which extend the Census sampling coincides with the timing of deregulation. The first 
column of Table 8 lists all the states that deregulated between 1977 and 1992 as shown in 
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Figure 1.10 The grey areas on the horizontal axis are the Census sampling years and the 
crosses reflect the effective date of deregulation in each state. Depending on how long the 
impact of deregulation takes to complete, the group that deregulated by 1980 was most 
likely affected during the period 1977-1982. Similarly, the impact period for the group 
that deregulated by 1983 is most likely to be 1982-1987 and for the group that 
deregulated by 1987 it is the period 1987-1992. To the extend that deregulation caused 
positive changes outside these perceived treatment periods, the estimated returns to 
deregulation will be attenuated during the impact period and upward biased in other 
periods. 
 As a first test whether deregulation has had any impact at all, Table 9 compares 
outcomes in deregulating industries with the same industries in non-deregulating states 
and other industries in every other state. This is done using the following specification in 
each period: 
(1) isisisis BAIy εββ ++++=∆ 10  
with isy∆  the change in the log of employment, revenue or the number of shops in 
industry i and state s and with Iis a dummy equal to 1 if industry i in state s deregulated in 
that period. Terms As and Bi further capture state and industry fixed effects respectively.  
 The first specification used in columns (1), (4) and (7) of Table 9 excludes the 
state dummies from (1). For each dependent variable the estimated returns are different in 
each time period and sometimes even negative. One explanation for the observed 
                                                 
10
 Excluded are North Dakota and Missouri. North Dakota is excluded because it only deregulated in 1991. 
Missouri is excluded because deregulation in 1979 implied counties could opt-out of state regulation. This 
happened gradually with 34 counties choosing to opt-out between 1979 and 1985, a further 19 counties 
between 1986 and 1990 and 12 counties opted-out between 1991 and 1992. See Appendix B for more 
details. 
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differences in point estimates is the sensitivity of retail activity to macroeconomic shocks 
and cycles and the fact that there is substantial geographical dispersion of shocks and 
cycles within the US.11 For example, the smaller point estimates for the period 1977-1982 
can partially be explained by that the recession in the late 1970’s mostly affecting a band 
of states just east of the Mississippi running from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico 
including deregulating states Pennsylvania and to a lesser extend New Jersey. The higher 
point estimates found for the period 1982-1987 can be explained by the rapid expansion 
of the New England economy including deregulating states Massachusetts and to some 
extend Vermont. Finally, the lower point estimates for the period 1987-1992 partially 
reflect the plunge in oil and gas prices in the second half of the 1980’s that struck the 
natural-resource-based states in the South Central, especially deregulating states 
Louisiana and Texas. It seems therefore important to control for aggregate differences 
between states in isolating the causal impact of deregulating Sunday Closing Laws. 
 To this end, columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table (9) include state dummies, just as in 
equation (1). The point estimates are now all positive and range between 3.5 to 6 percent 
for employment, 4.5 and 10 percent for sales and 1 and 2 percent for the number of 
shops. Note that these numbers are roughly similar to those reported in the bottom row of 
Table 2 and Table 7. Finally, to see whether state dummies mainly take out variation 
between states due to differences in economic success, columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 
(9) replace the state dummies with differences in the log of the state wide unemployment 
rate, personal disposable income and population. Also, because these controls seem to 
vary similarly between the 5 geographical divisions used by the Census Bureau, region 
                                                 
11
 See Dzialo, Shank and Smith [1993] for a discussion of how different macro economic shocks and cycles 
have affected different regions in the US between 1977 and 1992. 
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dummies are also added as additional controls to potentially exclude further bias. The 
point estimates are very similar to those obtained using the state dummies indeed.  
  
The impact of deregulation on employment, revenue and the number of shops 
The estimates in Table 9 do not necessarily reflect the true return to deregulation 
for deregulating industries if also other industries are indirectly affected by deregulation. 
To this end, consider the following specification using only the sample of deregulating 
industries in each period: 
(2) isirsisis BAXIy εβββ +++∆++=∆ 210  
with sX∆ the change in the log of the unemployment rate, personal disposable income 
and population for that period and with Ar a set of 5 region dummies. Terms sX∆ and Ar 
are included since the results in Table 9 suggested these controls take out a potential bias 
in the estimated returns in case no state dummies can be added. Also note that relative to 
equation (1), equation (2) further provides a specification test in that all right-hand side 
coefficients are now specific to deregulating industries, just like the coefficient of 
interest 1β . 
Estimates using equation (2) are given in Table 10. The point estimates suggest 
that deregulation increases employment with 4.5 to 6.5 percent, revenue with 4 to 10 
percent and the number of shops with 1 to 1.5 percent in deregulating industries. 
Clustered standard errors reveal many of the estimated returns are statistically significant. 
Three points can be made about the observed impact of deregulation. First, the estimated 
returns are similar to those reported in earlier tables despite the different methods or 
specifications used or the possible measurement error in the timing of deregulation. 
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Second, the estimated returns are relatively large. For example, our data suggest that the 
average cyclical upswing increases revenue with about 20 to 30 percent. Finally, the 
similarity of point estimates between Tables 9 and 10 also suggests that the estimated 
returns for other industries are largely insignificant (which upon further inspection seems 
to be true). If anything, note this is consistent with the evidence presented in Table 5 that 
deregulation might have a negative impact on retail labor and product markets in more 
narrowly defined exempted industries.  
To conclude, estimates so far suggest deregulation is likely to have an impact on 
retail labor and product markets. Following deregulation, employment is expected to 
increase with 4.4 to 6.4 percent, revenue with 3.9 to 10.7 percent and the number of shops 
with 1 to 1.5 percent in deregulating industries. Also, the results presented here are not 
inconsistent with the hypothesis put forward earlier that deregulation possibly has a 
negative impact on labor and product markets in exempted industries. 
 
Some robustness checks 
For each group of deregulating states, Table 10 assumed the period of impact was 
measured accurately. If this is the case, no impact of deregulation should be observed in 
other periods. Figure 2 therefore plots the point estimates in Table 10 together with point 
estimates for other periods. For example, the first three bars in the top panel of Figure 2 
draw the point estimates given in the top panel of Table 10. The next three bars estimate 
the returns to deregulation for states that deregulated by 1980 for the period 1982-1987 
and so forth. It is clear from Figure 2 that the estimated returns in Table 10 do not seem 
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largely affected by differing trends or that measurement error in the timing of 
deregulation.   
Whereas most of the point estimates in Table 10 are between 1 and 5 percent, 
estimated employment and revenue growth in Massachusetts and Vermont seems 
relatively large. This could either suggest that the estimate is upward biased or that 
deregulation did imply a larger change in these states (maybe due to the economic boom 
in the North East when deregulation took place). To further examine this, Figure 3 uses 
an alternative data set. The figure uses an annualized measure of real retail revenue 
derived from the Monthly Retail Trade Survey between 1978 and 1992. Unfortunately, 
these historical series are only available for a number of states but a useful comparison 
between Massachusetts (which deregulated in December 1982) and neighboring state 
New York can be made. The top panel of Figure 3 gives the raw differences between both 
states. The top panel suggests a difference-in-differences between 1982 and 1987 of 
about 10 percent, similar to the point estimate given in Table 10. But one concern is the 
possibility that the difference-in-differences between 1982 and 1992 of about 3 percent is 
the better long-run measure of structural change. The bottom panel of Figure 3 therefore 
draws the series adjusted for changes in the unemployment rate, personal disposable 
income and population. The regression adjusted series suggests that deregulation did have 
a persistent and relatively large impact of 7 to 8 percent on retail revenue in 
Massachusetts.  
 An interesting question is which industries gain most from deregulation. Table 11 
therefore uses the following specification for each of 4 deregulating industries in each 
period:  
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(3) srsss AXIy εβββ ++∆++=∆ 210  
with sy∆  the change in the log of annual revenue. Remarkably, the largest impact is 
estimated for the group building materials and garden stores, furniture and home 
furnishings stores and clothes stores, just as in Table 5. Maybe an intuitive explanation 
for these results is that Sunday opening increases activity in home and garden related 
activities because that is what consumers do on Sunday. Alternatively, the increase in 
clothes stores might suggest that some consumers regard Sunday shopping as a preferable 
pastime activity. This intuition will return when the next section presents a model in order 
to understand the observed impact of deregulation.  
  
The impact of deregulation on average weekly wages 
 One issue ignored so far has been the possible impact of deregulation on wages. 
Table 12 therefore uses specification (2) to examine the impact of deregulation on 
average weekly wages in deregulating industries. This is made possible because the 
Census of Retail Trade also provides a measure of annual payroll. Comparing the 
percentage changes in employment with the percentage changes in annual payroll it is 
then possible to say something about the impact of deregulation on average weekly 
wages. The first column of Table 12 reproduces the point estimates found in the first 
column of Table 10. The second column in Table 12 gives point estimates for annual 
payroll. The point estimates are very similar and if anything somewhat larger for the 
payroll data indicating a small but insignificant increase in average weekly wages. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that deregulation increases product demand and therefore 
labor demand as will be argued next.  
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V. A MODEL TO ANALYZE THE IMPACT OF EXTENDING OPENING 
HOURS ON LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS 
 
Throughout this section, it is assumed that each shop has some market power by 
offering a differentiated product and that in the long-run barriers to entry are low. 
Building on these and other standard assumptions about retail markets, this section then 
provides a framework to explain the observed impact of deregulation by accounting for 
changes in consumer behavior, retail competition and ultimately labor demand. We will 
consider the case of Sunday opening, although the model equally applies to any extension 
of opening times. The model presented here is informal and a more technical exposition 
can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 The impact of extending opening hours on employment and sales 
Empirical evidence suggests that employment costs in retail vary with opening 
times and the volume of sales (Nooteboom [1982, 1983] and Thurik [1982]). The idea 
that part of labor costs only vary with opening times can be justified by noting that one 
must employ at least one worker at all times. Furthermore, there seems to be considerable 
empirical evidence in favor of constant marginal labor costs. Total labor costs per week 
therefore write as  
(4) XcDcC XD +=  
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with Dc threshold labor costs per day, D the number of opening days a week,  Xc constant 
marginal labor costs and X the volume of weekly sales. Weekly employment is then given 
by 
(5) XnDnN XD +=  
with nD threshold labor per day and nX inverse marginal labor productivity.12  
The impact of Sunday opening on weekly employment can then be analyzed 
through an increase of D in (5). If consumers only inter-temporally substitute income 
from others days of the week to Sunday, the volume of weekly sales does not increase 
after deregulation and weekly employment only increases with the additional required 
threshold labor (threshold labor effect). But derived demand in (5) also learns that if 
deregulation implies an increase in the volume of sales, employment further increases 
(sales effect). A sales effect could be expected if consumers have a taste for Sunday 
shopping.  If this is the case, consumers are willing to pay the price for this new “good” 
and total revenue in deregulating industries will increase. The previous section provided 
some direct evidence for this hypothesis. And to the extend an increase in revenue 
                                                 
12
 Equations (4) and (5) are related by that cD  =  wnD  and cX = wnX  with w the wage per unit of time (and 
abstracting from other costs items related to opening times and sales). For example, assume that weekly 
sales are given by 
)(1 DDnN
Xn
X −=
  
if N strictly exceeds the required amount of threshold labor and zero otherwise. Besides a standard 
production function, this relationship can also reflect a first order approximation to Nooteboom’s [1983] 
“isomenes” (equal-waiting curves). In Nooteboom’s model, employment depends positively on sales since 
firms want to keep the relative waiting time (average waiting time relative to the average service time per 
customer) at approximately 
Xn . This gives the following expression for labor demand: 
  XnDnN xD +=  
if X > 1/nX and zero otherwise. Integrating over wages then gives (4). 
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reflects an increase in the volume of sales, a sales effect must partially explain the 
observed increase in employment.13 Moreover, the next section argues that if the sales 
effect is sufficiently large, Sunday opening will increase retail profitability and therefore 
the number of shops. 
 
 The impact of extending opening hours on retail profitability 
 If the increase in total revenue outweighs the increase in labor costs, profits will 
increase and retailers will decide to open on Sunday.14 If barriers to entry are low, the 
number of shops will therefore increase in the long-run until all profits are exhausted. 
                                                 
13
 Whether the increase in total revenue is driven by an increase in prices or the volume of sales (or both) 
ultimately depends on how retailers set prices given demand for their products and retailing costs. Skuterud 
[2004] and Burda and Weil [2001] find some evidence that prices marginally increase after deregulation. In 
general, there is a small literature that looks at the impact of deregulation on prices using different 
assumptions about how retailers set prices, product demand and retailing costs. According to Inderst and 
Irmen [2004], the theoretical literature is divided about whether prices should increase or decrease after 
deregulation. In any case, the empirical and theoretical analysis presented in this paper is consistent with 
either of both.   
14
 If threshold labor costs are too high, it is not immediately clear why retailers would decide to extend their 
opening hours. Alternatively, one could think of some models that assume deregulation will be effective 
even if it is not profitable to do so for retailers in the short-run. First, if Sunday opening smoothes 
consumption across days of the week and marginal labor productivity is sufficiently decreasing in sales, 
cost savings in midweek outweigh the total costs of Sunday opening. However, the required concavity in 
the production of daily labor does not seem very likely given the empirical evidence in favor of (5). 
Moreover, even if the production of daily labor is sufficiently concave, it is then not immediately clear why 
deregulation would increase employment. Second, Sunday opening could increase shop space utilization or 
could even imply that optimal shop size becomes smaller because of a reduction in peak demand. If these 
cost savings outweigh the additional costs of Sunday opening, retailers will find it profitable to extend their 
opening hours even if weekly revenue is not increased. However, since these savings will only be realized 
when shop space is no longer sunk, it is not immediately clear why shops would extend their opening hours 
immediately after deregulation or even in the long-run. Finally, Sunday opening could relate to fears of 
losing too many customers to other shops when remaining closed. However, it then remains a question how 
shops can increase revenue to bear the costs of Sunday opening. 
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Given that consumers have a sufficiently strong taste for Sunday shopping, employment 
is therefore likely to increase not just because of increased threshold labor and an 
increase in the volume of sales but also an increase in the number of shops (profitability 
effect). Assuming all shops are identical for simplicity, this is easily seen since total labor 
demand in the steady state is given by 
(6) SXnSDnSN XD += . 
If an increase in D increases S and X, total employment will unambiguously increase.  
 Equation (6) suggests 3 possible channels through which deregulation can 
increase employment. First, deregulation directly increases employment through an 
increase in threshold labor. Second, deregulation will be effective if it is profitable for 
retailers to open on Sunday or if consumers have sufficiently strong tastes for Sunday 
shopping. In so far the increase in total revenue reflects an increase in the volume of 
sales, employment will further increase. Finally, increased profits will increase shop start-
ups in the long-run until all profits are exhausted. 
 To summarize, if consumers have sufficiently strong tastes for Sunday shopping,  
deregulation will increase employment in deregulating industries because of increased 
threshold labor (threshold labor effect) but also because of an increase in the total volume 
of sales (sales effect) and the number of shops in the long-run (profitability effect). The 
expected impact of deregulation on employment in deregulating industries must therefore 
be analyzed accounting for its impact on retail labor and product markets. Employment 
gains are expected to be larger if consumers have strong tastes for Sunday shopping, 
threshold labor is important (but not too important such that it is no longer profitable for 
retailers to open on Sunday) and low barriers to entry. 
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 The impact of extending shop opening hours on deregulating and non-
 deregulating industries 
If consumers use Sunday as a day for more shopping, total expenditure in 
deregulating shops will increase. However, this implies an unambiguous decrease in 
expenditure on other goods or services in other industries if total income does not 
increase. Deregulation is therefore expected to have a negative impact on total revenue, 
the number of shops and therefore employment in other industries. Some evidence for 
this hypothesis was presented above.  
To allow for this possibility, assume two types of shops exist: type s shops for 
which opening hours are being deregulated and type m shops for which opening hours are 
not being deregulated. Type m shops can either remain prohibited to trade on Sunday 
after deregulation or be exempted from Sunday Closing Laws before deregulation. 
Denote the number of type s shops as S and the number of type m shops as M. Also 
assume for simplicity all type s shops and all type m shops are identical but type s and 
type m shops can have different cost parameters. 
The solid lines in Figure 4 are the long-run zero-profit curves for type s shops 
(vertical axis) and type m shops (horizontal axis) before deregulation. First, the intercepts 
SM=0 and MS=0 are assumed to be finite and to depend positively on personal disposable 
income and negatively on threshold labor costs. Second, the zero-profit curves are 
assumed to be downward sloping for S and M strictly positive. To see this, consider the 
zero-profit curve for type s shops. If type s and type m goods are substitutes, an increase 
in M requires a decrease in the total fraction of income spent on type s goods. 
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Consequently, higher M reduces profitability in type s industries which decreases S. 
Finally, Figure 4 shows the intersection of the zero-profit curves determines the 
equilibrium number of shops S* and M* before deregulation. 15  
Assuming personal disposable income is constant, deregulation decreases from 
SM=0 to S’M=0 because of increased total threshold labor costs. But deregulation also 
rotates upwards the zero-profit curve for type s shops around S’M=0 and rotates inwards 
the zero-profit curve for type m shops around MS=0. The zero-profit curve for type s shops 
rotates upwards and for type m shops rotates inwards because consumers spend a larger 
fraction of total income on type s goods after deregulation. This rotating will be more 
outspoken the stronger are consumer preferences for Sunday shopping and the more 
substitutable products are between type s and type m shops. Also note that the zero-profit 
curves rotate around their intercepts because the intercepts do not change if personal 
disposable income is constant. 
 A new equilibrium is reached at (S**,M**). Because S** must lie on the zero-
profit curve for type s shops that has shifted upwards, total expenditure on type s goods 
must increase. Moreover, if it is profitable for retailers to open on Sunday, the increase in 
total revenue outweighs the increase in threshold labor costs and S**>S*. In this case, 
                                                 
15
 An important question is whether the analysis as drawn in Figure 4 can exist under standard assumptions 
about retailing costs, consumer preferences and retailer behavior. Appendix C formally derives the analysis 
summarized in Figure 4 using a Dixit-Stiglitz type model of monopolistic competition assuming labor costs 
are as in (4). The appendix starts from CES representative utility incorporating both types of shops, the 
number of shops for each type and the number of opening days for each shop in the utility function. Besides 
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz restrictions on the utility parameters, the appendix proofs that for a unique stable 
equilibrium to exist it is sufficient to assume the substitutability of goods between shops of different type is 
less than the substitutability between goods of similar type. This assumption does not seem too restrictive. 
The appendix then shows that the impact of deregulation is as shown in Figure 4. 
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employment in deregulating industries will increase because of an increase in threshold 
labor (threshold labor effect), total revenue (sales effect) and the number of shops 
(profitability effect). However, the inward rotation of the zero-profit curve for type m 
shops reflects an unambiguous decrease in total expenditure on type m goods. In the 
short-run, some type m shops will make losses and eventually the number of type m 
shops unambiguously decreases. The decrease in total revenue and the number of shops 
predicts employment in non-deregulating industries will fall. In analogy with the 
employment gains in deregulating industries, the employment losses in other industries 
will be larger if consumers have a strong taste for Sunday shopping, threshold labor is 
important and barriers to entry are low. 
  
 The impact of deregulation on wages and prices 
So far this section has ignored the possibility that deregulation also affects wages. 
The evidence presented in the previous section suggested that if anything wage would 
increase because of an increase in product and therefore labor demand. If wages increase 
significantly (maybe because of legally imposed requirements for working irregular 
hours), threshold labor costs and marginal labor costs will increase. It then is 
straightforward to show that the increase (decrease) in total revenue, the number of shops 
and therefore employment in deregulating (non-deregulating) industries will be smaller.  
Finally, note that the analysis assumed that all type s shops set a unique price and 
all type m shops set a unique price before and after deregulation.16 However, in so far the 
                                                 
16
 In the model presented in Appendix C retailers perceive demand to be iso-elastic and charge a constant 
mark-up over marginal costs. Deregulation therefore has no impact on the price set by each retailer. 
 
 26 
observed increase in total revenue reflects an increase in the price of deregulated goods, 
the expected impact of deregulation on employment will be smaller. Also note that the 
analysis in Figure 4 explicitly accounts for the possibility that deregulation affects 
aggregate prices since Figure 4 allows for type s and type m shops to charge different 
prices in equilibrium. For example, assume labor productivity in type s shops is higher 
than in type m shops such that type s shops charge a lower price. In this case, part of the 
increase in S and decrease in M is explained by consumers substituting income towards 
deregulating industries because type s workers are more productive. The more productive 
type s workers are, the bigger will be the gains (losses) for type s (type m) industries, the 
bigger will be the increase in average productivity and the bigger will the decrease in the 
aggregate price index.  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This paper has argued there are important deficiencies in our understanding of 
how shop closing hours affect employment in retail industries. Using a number of data 
sets and a number of different techniques, it was first shown that regulation most likely 
decreases employment with 4.4 to 6.4 percent, revenue with 3.9 to 10.7 percent and the 
number of shops with 1 to 2 percent in regulated industries. Some evidence also 
suggested regulation increases employment, revenue and the number of shops in 
industries exempted from such laws. This paper then provided a framework in which the 
observed impact of regulation could be understood. If total disposable income is constant, 
it was argued that employment in regulated industries is lower the more important is 
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threshold labor (threshold labor effect), the more consumers substitute income towards 
exempted industries (sales effect) and the lower are barriers to entry (profitability effect). 
However, it was also argued that employment in exempted industries will be higher for 
similar reasons. In any debate about the impact of deregulation, it seems therefore 
important to simultaneously account for its expected impact on retail labor and product 
markets and therefore ultimately employment. 
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Table 1 
Percentages of Total Retail by Industry, 1997 
Building materials and garden stores 9.768 14.22 10.50
(1.429) (2.730) (2.037)
General merchandise stores 21.72 20.07 4.173
(3.481) (3.434) (1.163)
Apparel and accessory stores 10.45 7.733 16.42
(2.478) (2.592) (3.239)
Furniture and home furnishing stores 6.769 7.587 11.43
(1.055) (1.639) (1.340)
Miscellaneous retail stores 11.35 8.358 22.26
(2.094) (1.262) (3.346)
Food stores 23.84 22.58 12.33
(3.026) (2.694) (2.532)
Supermarkets and other grocery stores 21.54 20.97 7.358
(2.679) (2.391) (1.321)
Convenience stores 1.364 1.029 2.799
(0.904) (0.634) (1.442)
Specialty food stores 0.932 0.573 2.171
(0.450) (0.324) (0.952)
Drug and propriety stores 7.227 6.746 8.506
(1.809) (1.906) (1.381)
Cosmetics, beauty and perfume stores 1.572 1.025 3.930
(0.340) (0.242) (0.859)
Pharmacies and drug stores 5.655 5.720 4.575
(1.684) (1.811) (1.201)
Gasoline service stations 8.875 12.70 14.38
(2.709) (3.047) (3.284)
Other Industries
Regulated Industries
Annual Revenue   Number of ShopsWeekly Employment
 
 
Notes:  Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. Weekly Employment measures the 
number of paid employees in the week including March 12. Listed industries are defined using NAICS 
industry classifications. The percentages are mean percentages across all states and the standard error 
in brackets reflects variation in the industry composition in retail across all states.
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Table 2 
Mean Percentages of Total Retail for Regulated Industries in States with and 
without Sunday Closing Laws, 1997 
I. States with Sunday Closing Laws 57.11 54.80 61.09
(1.145) (1.363) (0.798)
II. States without Sunday Closing Laws 60.71 58.67 65.59
(0.608) (0.518) (0.598)
I - II -3.596 -3.868 -4.496
(1.410) (1.273) (1.341)
(I -II)/ I -0.060 -0.068 -0.070
(0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
Weekly 
Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers in brackets are standard 
errors. For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see Appendix A.
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Table 3 
Mean Differences in States with and without Sunday Closing Laws, 1997 
Regulated Industries -2.481 -603.0 -0.096
(1.090) (192.2) (0.158)
Other Industries 0.917 -37.39 0.204
(0.202) (20.79) (0.021)
Difference-in-differences -3.399 -565.6 -0.301
(0.914) (100.4) (0.099)
Regulated Industries 1.200 -108.8 0.223
(1.822) (235.9) (0.228)
Other Industries 3.576 349.3 0.410
(1.323) (133.8) (0.141)
Difference-in-differences -2.376 -458.1 -0.187
(2.252) (271.2) (0.268)
Per 1000 inhabitants
Per $21.7m of personal disposable income
Weekly 
Employment
Annual Revenue 
($1000) Number of Shops
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers are mean differences of 
percentages between states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. The numbers in brackets are 
standard errors. For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see 
Appendix A. 
 32 
 
Table 4 
Differences in Means for Annual Revenue (in thousands of $) in States with and 
without Sunday Closing Laws for each Regulated Industry, 1997 
Building material and garden stores -156.4 -44.34
(83.12) (107.3)
General merchandise stores -107.7 72.21
(107.7) (135.1)
Apparel and accesory stores -95.34 -24.76
(84.55) (71.56)
Furniture and home furnishings stores -138.0 -76.13
(48.18) (41.50)
Miscellaneous retail stores -105.5 -35.77
(11.63) (11.48)
Per 1000 inhabitants Per $21.7m of PDI
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers are mean differences of 
percentages between states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. The numbers in brackets are 
standard errors. For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see 
Appendix A.
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Table 5 
Differences in Means for Annual Revenue in States with and without Sunday 
Closing Laws for each Other Industry, 1997 
Food stores -98.45 106.1
(88.23) (74.36)
Supermarkets and other grocery stores -87.24 102.9
(79.20) (74.09)
Convenience stores -2.836 7.270
(19.01) (17.39)
Specialty food stores -8.374 -4.054
(8.210) (6.880)
Drug and propriety stores 7.647 73.35
(48.08) (40.29)
Cosmetics, beauty and perfume stores -17.17 -8.402
(1.663) (1.452)
Pharmacies and drug stores 24.82 81.75
(45.20) (38.68)
Gasoline service stations 53.41 169.8
(77.60) (106.2)
Per 1000 inhabitants Per $21.7m of PDI
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the 1997 Census of Retail Trade. The numbers are mean differences of 
percentages between states with and without Sunday Closing Laws. The numbers in brackets are 
standard errors. For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing Laws, see 
Appendix A.
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Table 6 
Percentages of Total Retail by Industry, 1977-1992 
Building materials and garden stores 6.405 8.107 7.600
(1.179) (1.719) (1.928)
General merchandise stores 20.32 17.80 4.047
(2.439) (2.451) (1.107)
Apparel and accessory stores 10.50 7.259 13.74
(1.564) (1.382) (1.764)
Furniture and home furnishing stores 6.291 6.382 10.23
(0.700) (0.913) (1.030)
Miscellaneous retailers 16.54 13.84 28.20
(2.750) (3.776) (3.971)
Food stores 26.91 30.18 18.34
(2.319) (2.248) (2.545)
Drug and propriety stores 5.532 5.088 5.016
(0.776) (0.961) (0.921)
Gasoline service stations 7.490 11.34 12.83
(1.498) (2.131) (2.150)
Deregulating Industries
Other Industries
Annual Revenue   Number of ShopsWeekly 
employment
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade. Weekly Employment measures the number of 
paid employees in the week including March 12. Annual Revenue is in 1985 dollars. The industries 
listed are the most disaggregate information available from the Economic Census and is based on SIC 
industry codes. Percentages are calculated after pooling years 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992. The standard 
errors reflect the variation in industry composition across states.
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Table 7 
 Percentage Difference in Mean Fraction of Deregulating Industries   
 between States with and without Sunday Closing Laws by Year, 1977-
1992 
1992 -0.023 -0.053 -0.052
(0.025) (0.043) (0.025)
1987 -0.018 -0.029 -0.010
(0.021) (0.029) (0.021)
1982 -0.021 -0.038 -0.018
(0.023) (0.034) (0.019)
1977 -0.023 -0.048 -0.019
(0.025) (0.030) (0.022)
Weekly 
Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
 
 
 Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade, 1977-1992. The numbers in brackets 
 are standard errors. For the grouping of states into those with and without Sunday Closing 
 Laws, see Appendices A and B.
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Table 8 
The Timing of Deregulation and Census Sampling, 1977-1992 
1977 1982 1987 1992
Deregulated by 1980
Pennsylvania X
Connecticut X
New Jersey X
Deregulated by 1983
Vermont X
Massachusetts X
Deregulated by 1987
Mississippi X
Texas X
Louisiana X
 
 
  Notes: References to exact date of deregulation are found in Appendix B. 
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Table 9 
The Impact of Deregulation using all Industries and all States, 1977-1992 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dummy for deregulating industries -0.003 0.038 0.044 0.051 0.043 0.036 -0.013 0.011 0.011
(0.039) (0.017) (0.020) (0.051) (0.042) (0.045) (0.014) (0.013) (0.019)
State dummies
State specific controls and region dummies
Dummy for deregulating industries 0.156 0.060 0.054 0.233 0.097 0.085 0.078 0.021 0.012
(0.023) (0.042) (0.038) (0.032) (0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.020) (0.018)
State dummies
State specific controls and region dummies
Dummy for deregulating industries -0.014 0.035 0.048 0.020 0.046 0.042 -0.096 0.013 0.009
(0.019) (0.027) (0.032) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.019)
State dummies
State specific controls and region dummies
Period 1977-1982
Period 1982-1987
Period 1987-1992
Change in Log(Dependent Variable)
W eekly Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
 
 
 Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade 1977-1992. The first specification only includes dummies for industry as additional 
 controls. The second specification includes industry and states dummies. The final specification includes industry dummies, growth in state 
 wide unemployment, population and personal disposable income and 5 region dummies. Standard errors are clustered by whether the industry 
 belongs to the group of deregulating industries or not interacted with state cells. The number of observations is between 389 and 400.
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Table 10 
 The Impact of Deregulation on Deregulating Industries using all States, 1977-
1992 
Returns to deregulation 0.044 0.039 0.012
(0.021) (0.046) (0.019)
Returns to deregulation 0.064 0.107 0.015
(0.038) (0.028) (0.018)
Returns to deregulation 0.046 0.044 0.009
(0.032) (0.015) (0.019)
Period 1977-1982
Period 1982-1987
Period 1987-1992
Change in Log (Dependent Variable)
Weekly 
Employment Annual Revenue Number of Shops
 
 
 Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade 1977-1992. All regressions include changes 
 in the log of the state wide unemployment rate, population and personal disposable income, 5 
 region dummies and industry dummies. Standard errors are clustered by state. The number of 
 observations is between 197 and 200.
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Table 11 
The Impact of Deregulation on Annual Revenue in each Deregulating Industry 
using all States by Period, 1977-1992 
Building materials and garden stores 0.076 0.127 0.033
(0.094) (0.114) (0.088)
General merchandise stores -0.001 0.086 0.127
(0.063) (0.046) (0.087)
Apparel and accessory stores 0.032 0.105 0.054
(0.041) (0.068) (0.058)
Furniture and home furnishing stores 0.037 0.106 -0.038
(0.071) (0.089) (0.057)
1977-1982 1982-1987 1987-1992
Period
 
 
Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade 1977-1992. All regressions include changes in 
the log of the state wide unemployment rate, population and personal disposable income and 5 region 
dummies. The number of observations is between 48 and 50.
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Table 12 
 The Impact of Deregulation on Average Weekly Wages in 
 Deregulating Industries using all States, 1977-1992 
Returns to deregulation
Returns to deregulation
Returns to deregulation
Period 1977-1982
Period 1982-1987
Period 1987-1992
0.064
(0.038) (0.046)
0.044
(0.033)(0.021)
Change in Log (Dependent Variable)
Weekly 
Employment Annual Payroll
0.055
0.073
(0.032)(0.032)
0.0610.046
 
 
 Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade 1977-1992. All regressions 
 include the change in the log of state wide unemployment, population and personal 
 disposable  income, 5 region dummies and industry dummies. Standard errors are 
 clustered by state. The number of observations is between 198 and 200. 
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Figure 1 
The US History of General Sunday Closing Laws, 1979-1997 
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Figure 2 
 The Impact of Deregulation on Deregulating Industries for all Periods, 1977-
1992 
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 Notes: Data are taken from the Census of Retail Trade 1977-1992. All regressions include the log 
 of state wide unemployment, population and personal disposable income, the interaction of 
 year dummies with 5 region dummies and the interaction of year dummies with industry dummies. 
 In addition, all regressions further include industry, state, state-industry and time dummies. 
 Standard errors are clustered by state-year cells. The number of observations is between 394 and 
 400. 
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Figure 3 
 Differences in Annual Retail Revenue between Massachusetts and New York, 
1978-1992 (1978=100) 
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 Notes: Data are taken from the annualized Monthly Retail Sales Survey. The series in the lower 
 panel are constructed by taking the difference between actual (deflated and normalized to 
 1978=100 as in the top panel) and predicted revenue. Predicted revenue is expected revenue from 
 changes in the log of state wide unemployment, population and personal disposable income.
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Figure 4 
The Impact of Deregulating Shop Closing Hours on Revenue and the 
Number of Shops 
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Appendix A 
Current General Sunday Closing Laws 
 
Alabama
Kentucky
Maine
New Hampshire
Oklahoma
Rhode Island
South Carolina
West Virginia
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 332-D:4: "The governing body of 
any city or town may adopt bylaws and ordinances 
permitting and regulating retail businesses."
Ala. Code 13A-12-1: "The keeping of an open store 
on Sunday is prohibited."
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 436.160: "Any person who works 
on Sunday or employs another person on Sunday shall 
be fined not less than $2 and not more than 50$ for 
each violation."
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 17:3204: "Businesses cannot 
be open to the public on Sundays [...]."
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 436-165: "Any legaslative body of 
any city or county may further permit or regulate retail 
sales on Sunday [...]."
Okla. Stat. Tit. 21: 918: "Secular labor, trades and all 
manner of public selling of any commodities are acts 
forbidden to be done on the first day of the week, the 
doing of which is Sabbath-breaking."
R.I. Gen. Laws 5-23-1: "Retail establishments 
licensed by the town council or any town may be 
permitted to open for business on Sundays between 
noon and 6 p.m and on holidays during normal working 
hours."
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 332-D:2: Opening of shops or 
selling any merchandise is prohibited on Sunday.
W. Va. Code 61-10-25: "It shall be unlawful to engage 
in work, labor or business on Sunday."
W. Va. Code 61-10-28: "The county court of any 
county is hereby authorized to call a local option 
election for the purpose of determining the will of the 
voters as to whether the provisions of section 61-10-25 
shall continue to have effect in said county."
S.C. Code Ann. 53-1-5: "It shall be unlawful for any 
person to sell at retail any goods on Sunday before 
1.30 p.m on Sunday."
S.C. Code Ann. 53-1-150 to 170: "Counties also have 
the option of suspending certain Sunday closing laws."
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Appendix B 
The US History of General Sunday Closing Laws, 1979-2004 
 
North Dakota
Louisiana
Mississippi
Texas
Massachussetts
Vermont
Missouri
New Jersey
Connecticut
Pennsylvania
Ct. Gen. Stat. Ann. 53-302a: "No person, firm or 
corporation shall engage in work, labor or business, or 
employ others in work, labor or business on Sunday."
Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 
417 A.2d struck down the entire state wide scheme. 
Effective April 1979.
Pa. Stat. Ann. 18-7361: "A person is guilty of a 
summary offense if he does or performs any worldly 
employment or business whatsoever on Sunday."
Kroger Co. v. O'Hara Tp. 392 A2d 266 481 Pa. 101 
struck down the entire state wide scheme. Effective 
October 1978.
Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.100: "On Sunday, it is a 
misdemeanor to engage in in the business of selling 
clothing and wearing apparel and accessories; 
furniture; housewares; home business or office 
furnishings and appliances; hardware; tools; paints; 
building and lumber supply materials; jewelry; 
silverware; watches; clocks; luggage; musical 
instruments and recordings or toys." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. 578.110: "Any counties may exempt 
itself from provisions 578.100 by vote of qualified 
voters at any election (for larger counties) or public 
hearing (for smaller counties)." Between November 
1979 and June 1985, 34 counties deregulated, 
between April 1986 and November 1990, 19 counties 
deregulated and between April 1991 and April 1995, 
22 counties deregulated.
N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A-171-1 prohibited wordly 
employment or business on Sunday. 
Repealed September 1979.
Repealed September 1986.
Ms. Stat. Ann. 97-23-67 generally prohibited sales on 
Sunday.
Repealed July 1986.
Ma. Gen. Laws Ann. 136.50: "It is no longer 
prohibited to keep open a store or shop and sell retail 
goods therein […] provided […] any store or shop shall 
not open for business on Sunday prior to the hour of 
noon." Effective December 1982.
Ma. Gen. Laws Ann. 136.5: "Sunday shall be a 
common day of rest. Whoever on Sunday keeps open 
his shop, […], or does any labor, business or work, 
except works of necessity and charity, shall be 
punished […]."
Sunday Closing Law Date of Deregulation
N.D. Cent. Code 12.1-30-01: "It is a misdemeanor for 
any person between the hours of twelve midnight and 
twelve noon on Sunday to conduct a business or labor 
for profit [...]."
Repealed February 1991.
La. Stat. Ann. 51-191: "All stores, shops, saloons and 
all places of public business, […], shall be closed at 
twelve o'clock on Saturday nights, and remain closed 
continuously for twenty-four hours, during which time 
no proprietor thereof shall give, trade, barter, 
exchange or sell any stock or any article of 
merchandise kept in his establishment."
Repealed December 1986.
Vt. Stat. Ann. 13-3351/52 related to the establishment 
of a common day of rest and the prohibition of 
business on such day.
State v. Ludlow Supermarkets Inc. 141 Vt. 261, 448 
A2d 791 struck down the entire state wide scheme. 
Effective May 1982.
Tx. Stat. Ann. 132-9001 prohibited the sale of goods 
on both the two consecutive days of Saturday and 
Sunday. 
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Appendix C 
This appendix presents a formal Dixit-Stiglitz type model of monopolistic 
competition to analyze the impact of deregulating shop closing hours. The informal 
model described in the text can be summarized using representative utility given by  
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with ijmx consumption from shop i on day j given the opening hours of the shop were not 
deregulated (type m shop) and ijsx  consumption from shop i on day j given the opening hours of 
the shop are being deregulated (type s shop). The number of type m shops is M and the number 
of type s shops is S. The number of hours per week type m shops can trade is mD and the number 
of hours per week type s shops can open is sD . For the indifference curves to be convex and 
finite we need that 10 << δ , 10 << γ , 10 << ρ . Also assume that γρ <  or that the 
substitutability between type m and type s shops is smaller than the substitutability between 
shops of similar type. Also note that consumer tastes for shopping during extended opening 
hours is captured by δ/1 . 
 
Demand for retail goods 
Denote mP  and sP  as the standard Dixit-Stiglitz price indices for each type m and type s 
shop and mP  and sP  the standard price indices for all type m and s goods respectively. If in 
equilibrium all type m shops set a unique weekly price mp and all type s shops set a unique 
weekly price sp , mP  and sP  simplify to 
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Given (C.2) and (C.3), mP  and sP write as  
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Weekly demand at each type m and s shop is then given by 
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with mσ  the fraction of total income Y spent on all type m shops which in equilibrium is given 
by  
(C.8) 
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Supply of retail goods 
Each shop sells a differentiated product. Shops have some monopoly power and enough 
shops exist such that each store perceives its demand only to depend on its own price. The first 
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order conditions for maximizing profits then gives the familiar result that  prices are a constant 
mark-up over marginal costs or mm cp =γ . Similarly, in equilibrium we must have that ss cp =γ . 
Assuming free entry of shops this gives the following zero-profit conditions: 
(C.9) mmm FXc =
−
γ
γ1
  
(C.10) sss FXc =
−
γ
γ1
 
with F threshold labor costs and other costs independent of sales. 
Substituting (C.4) and (C.5) into (C.8) and (C.2), (C.4) and (C.8) into (C.6) and (C.6) into 
(C.9) and rearranging terms gives the following zero-profit condition for type m shops: 
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Similarly, the zero-profit condition for all type s shops can be written as 
(C.13) 
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If ργ > , zero-profit conditions (C.11) and (C.13) have vertical asymptotes at 0=M and 0=S  
respectively.  Inspection of the first order derivatives of S with respect to M in (C.11) and M with 
respect to S in (C.13) learns that for all possible parameter values the first order derivative is 
strictly negative if 0=< SMM  in (C.11) and 0=< MSS  in (C.13) and zero if 0== SMM in (C.11) 
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and 0== MSS  in (C.13). For all possible parameter values the second order derivatives are 
strictly positive for all 0=< SMM  in (C.11) and all 0=< MSS  in (C.13). Figure 4 illustrates the 
equilibrium *)*,( MS . Also note that in (C.11) an increase in S of one requires a decrease in M 
less than one and in (C.13) a decrease in M of one requires an increase in S of less than one. This 
implies the equilibrium is stable. 
 
The impact of deregulating shop closing hours 
Using (C.11) for any given S, an increase in sD  (relative to mD ) requires a fall in M. 
Using (C.13), an increase in sD  requires an increase in S for any given M. The increase in S 
further decreases M in (C.11) and the decrease in M further increases S in (C.13) until a new 
stable equilibrium is reached. Assuming fixed daily costs of production are sufficiently small, the 
number of type s shops unambiguously increases and the number of type m shops 
unambiguously decreases following an increase in sD . The dashed lines in Figure 4 reflect the 
impact of deregulation on the number of type m and s shops in equilibrium.  
Also note from (C.11) and (C.13) that for any given *)*,( MS the increase in S and the 
decrease in M following an increase in sD  are bigger if δ  is smaller or consumers have a 
preference for shopping on Sunday. Similarly, the increase in S and the decrease in M following 
an increase in sD  are bigger if ρ  is bigger or the substitutability of goods between type m and 
type s shops is higher.  
From (C.4), (C.5), (C.8), (C.11) and (C.13) it follows that an increase in sD  reduces the 
fraction of total income spent on type m goods, mσ . The increase in S and the decrease in M 
further decrease mσ as consumers will consume from every shop in equilibrium. The prediction 
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therefore is that total sales in type m shops decrease and total sales in type s shops increase 
following an increase in sD . Consequently employment in type m shops will decrease and 
employment in type s shops will increase.  
It can also be shown that following an increase in sD , the decrease (increase) of total 
sales in type m (s) shops will be larger if δ  is smaller or if consumers have a preference for 
shopping on Sunday. Similarly, if type m and s goods are more substitutable in consumption, the 
decrease (increase) of total sales in type m (s) shops will be larger if ρ  is bigger.  
 
 Multiple stable equilibria 
The solid line in Figure C.1 gives zero-profit conditions if )1(/)1( −− γρργ  is an 
even integer (and the dotted lines parts of the zero-profit conditions if )1(/)1( −− γρργ  
is not an even integer) and shows multiple equilibria. The analysis remains qualitatively 
unchanged. For example, the comparative statics for an increase in ms DD /  are given by 
the dashed lines. In all cases, S increases and M increases as before. 
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Figure C.1 
Multiple Stable Equilibria 
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